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Abstract
In this paper we study possible determinants of the use of incentive pay for managers in European companies. Data
from 5,000 firms in 15 countries are used to analyze the degree to which incentive pay is associated with national
embeddedness, local labour market institutions, ownership, and internationalization of markets. We find that companies
in countries with high scores on power distance and individualism tend to use incentive schemes for managers more
frequently than companies with lower scores on these cultural dimensions. Centralized wage bargaining and unionization
at the firm level tend to reduce the prevalence of such schemes. Incentive pay is less common in state-owned companies
than in privately owned firms. The findings also reveal that the more global the market in which a firm operates, the
greater the probability that it will implement incentive pay elements for its managers. Our results suggest that unions,
national labour market institutions and social and cultural norms serve as buffers against the introduction of US-style
compensation systems.
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Introduction
Performance-related pay such as bonuses, profit sharing and stock options constitutes an important
element in incentive systems for US managers, and such systems have become more common
throughout many European countries. Compensation tied to performance is assumed to give
managers incentives to act in line with the interests of the owners. Growth in the use of incentive
schemes may thus indicate a departure from «managerial» or «stakeholder» capitalism characteristic
of corporate life in many European countries and a convergence towards US «shareholder value
capitalism» (Buck and Shahrim, 2005).
Increased international competition, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, proliferation of
multinational enterprises, internationalisation of financial markets, growing competition for
executive talent, as well as spread of «best practice» have been emphasized as major sources of these
changes. Such trends should be particularly clear in Europe where the European Union (EU)
represents not only a common market for goods, services and labour, but also a common
institutional environment where rules and standards are harmonized. The European business venue
is thus affected by several parallel forces that might eventually lead to a convergence of business
practices (Gooderham et al., 2004; Mayrhofer et al., 2011; Stavrou et al., 2010).
Yet there are considerable variations in the use of these incentive pay schemes between firms across
European countries. Profit sharing, for instance, is commonplace in France but rare in Scandinavia.
According to previous research the Scandinavia countries in general appear to have the least
«Americanized» corporations in Europe, while the United Kingdom appears to be on the opposite
extreme (Gooderham, Nordhaug, and Ringdal, 1999) suggesting that there are major obstacles to
changes in favour of a US model. One reason may be that US style executive compensation is
incompatible with prevailing norms in many European countries, such as the strong egalitarian
tradition in Scandinavia. Others would emphasize institutional factors such as the role of trade
unions and national wage settlements in Europe compared to the USA.
Rather than focusing on the merit or legal aspects of incentive schemes (e.g., Ferrarini, Moloney,
and Vespro, 2004) in this paper we focus on the actual use of performance-related incentive schemes
and its underlying determinants. The aim is to investigate how cultural and institutional factors affect
firms’ propensity to adopt incentive pay for managers. Based on data from 5,000 firms in 15
countries, we analyze the degree to which the use of such pay elements can be accounted for by
nationality and local labour market institutions (wage bargaining centralization, unionization).
Within this sample, about 70 per cent of the firms use some form of incentive pay for their managers,
whereas 20 per cent offer managers stocks or stock options. Our analysis of nationality includes
two of Hofstede’s (1980) indicators of national, cultural embeddedness, that is, individualism and
power distance. In addition we apply indicators of the nationality of corporate headquarters and
measures of the degree to which the company operates in a domestic, regional (European) or global
environment.
Background
Executive pay has during the last decade been subject to intense scrutiny and even public outcry in
many European countries as well as in the U.S.A. (Bebchuk et al., 2010). Public concern and criticism
are related to total or base compensation, but even more so to fringe benefits, performance-related
incentive pay and golden parachutes. In the USA such schemes are extensive and widespread, and
Erik Døving & Odd Nordhaug | DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE PAY IN EUROPE
(PUBLISHER NOT AVAILABLE)
2
from an American perspective Norway’s domestic controversies may seem like a storm in a teacup
(Dale-Olsen, 2003). In large US companies, less than one third of total executive compensation
comes in the form of base salary, whereas more than 40 per cent comprise stocks, stock options
and bonuses (Goergen and Renneboog, 2011). Base salary for American executives is somewhat
higher than for their European counterparts, but the striking difference across the Atlantic is related
to the variable component of pay. Incentive pay, particularly stocks and options, has been the most
rapidly increasing component of total compensation for American top managers (Core, Guay, and
Larcker, 2003). American executives’ total compensation is in addition high relative to their own
subordinates.
Although American-style incentive pay has been copied by corporations in other countries, there
are still considerable differences with regard to the use of these pay strategies even within Western
Europe. According to the Hay Group bonuses for Norwegian executives are on average 15 per cent
of base salary, whereas in Germany bonus are on average the same amount as base salary. Stock
options are widespread in France and the UK compared to Scandinavia. The UK and Norway,
despite proximity across the North Sea, appears to be European extremes with regard to corporate
governance, British business in general tend to be more «Americanized» than Norway (Gooderham
et al., 1999).
These striking differences can only to a limited extent be accounted for by differences in industry
structure and other business conditions, and may instead be related to differences in cultural or
institutional environment. For instance, Rehu and associates (2005) concluded that there is a notable
difference in incentive preferences between US and German employees, suggesting that
compensation systems are related to cultural differences. This suggests that there are factors beyond
agency and corporate governance considerations affecting the choice of compensation schemes for
executives.
Compensation Schemes
Compensation schemes are key components of a firm’s personnel policy because it affects to what
degree the firm is able to attract, motivate and retain key employees. We focus on compensation in
straight cash or compensation that is at least readily negotiable, but does not include additional
compensation (such as pension schemes and fringe benefits) or golden parachutes for top managers
in larger companies. For the sake of simplicity we further assume that compensation schemes include
one or more of the following components: Base salary, stocks/stock options, merit pay, bonus, and
profit sharing.
Base salary includes a bundle of closely related compensation schemes, and usually refers to a system
of positions where each position is assigned tasks, responsibility, subordinates, decision making
authority as well as monthly payment attached. In some cases base salary is also determined by the
employee’s qualifications, in addition to characteristics of the position. Although base salary does
not vary with individual or firm performance, base salary still provides incentives for employee to
get promoted or to improve skills. Performance-related pay typically supplements base salary.
Although base salary also provides incentives, in this article incentive pay refers to pay that varies
with performance (including bonuses for reaching specified objectives).
Contrary to base salary, merit pay aims at influencing work performance directly. Piece rate, one of
the most popular forms of merit pay, implies that parts or all pay is determined by output quantity,
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for example sales agent commission. Bonus pay resembles merit pay in that it is calculated on the
basis of actual performance or is contingent on the attainment of a pre-specified goal. Bonus may
for example be granted to employees if the company achieves a certain level of productivity
improvements. Profit-related bonuses also resemble merit pay in that they are directly linked to
results. Profit sharing, however, implies that some or all employees share a percentage of company
profits.
In most large corporations, ownership and management is separated (Berle and Means, 1932). Stocks
and stock options, particularly for top managers, are thus compensation schemes that seek to align
the interests of owners and employees. The current value of stocks/stock options are of course
related to the value of profit sharing schemes, but depends on company prospects and on general
fluctuations in the stock market, in addition to company profits. Incentive schemes are often
alternative ways of obtaining the same outcome. Stock options, for example, will be an available
alternative only for listed companies, and stock market listing is less common in for example
Germany and Italy where pyramidal and cross-ownership structures are more common. Alternative
incentive schemes can be considered functional substitutes.
Empirical research on compensation schemes has generally been preoccupied with two issues. The
first line of research has dealt with compensation schemes as outcomes, and has sought to explain
why firms use incentive pay. This research has in particular focused on explanatory variables and
hypotheses derived from agency theory (e.g., Kang and Yanadori, 2011; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996).
In addition, empirical research has focused on the influence of institutional forces on administrative
practices in general (Gooderham et al., 1999) and compensation schemes in particular (Eisenhardt,
1988). The second line of research has focused on the relation between incentive pay and
performance, notably studies of the relationship between executive compensation and performance
(e.g., Carpenter and Sanders, 2002; Zajac and Westphal, 1994).
Although deliberate design and market forces may influence the use of incentive pay, there can at
the same time be powerful (non-market) institutional and cultural factors at play. Many of these
make compensation practices that are effective in one country inappropriate or even unworkable
in another context (Giardini, Kabst, and Müller-Camen, 2005; Gooderham et al., 2004; Gooderham
et al., 1999). This can be the case with regard to systems developed and applied in the USA, but it
can also be true across borders in Europe.
National Culture
Culture refers to the systems of meaning, values, beliefs, expectations and goals that are shared by
members of a particular group of people and that distinguish them from members of other groups.
Hofstede describes culture as a collective phenomenon within a country, a «collective programming
of the mind» for a group of people (Hofstede, 1980, 1991). However, what we observe are the
artefacts of cultural dissimilarity – the numerous and often pronounced differences in practices such
as greeting rituals or dress codes. Hofstede assumes that manifest culture builds on fundamental
values and that these values are essentially about what people regard as good and right. This mental
programming is assumed to be stable and resistant to change. Cultural differences can be found at
many different levels, professional, class and regional, but it is particularly potent at the national
level due to the socialization of generations.
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As an alternative to in-depth single-country studies scholars have attempted to classify cultures in
relation to one another by using a few, relatively broad fundamental dimensions that are particularly
relevant to corporate governance. Based on a survey among more than 100,000 IBM employees in
50 countries Hofstede identified four basic dimensions of national culture: Power distance,
uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, and masculinity/femininity. These are not
intended to describe individuals but are descriptions of national norms or values. Our basic
proposition is that management practices, in the same way as greeting rituals and dress codes, are
cultural artefacts and thus expressions of the underlying system of values (see also Oudenhoven,
2001). We believe that power distance and individualism are particularly influential with regard to
how easily executive incentive pay is culturally accepted.
Power distance indicates the extent to which a society expects and accepts a high degree of inequality
in institutions and organisations. In a country with a large power distance, organisations are
characterised by formal hierarchies and by subordinates who are reluctant to challenge their
superiors. In a country with a small power distance, subordinates expect to be consulted and the
ideal boss is a resourceful democrat rather than a benevolent autocrat. Because incentive pay to top
managers typically involves considerable handouts, such incentive schemes may imply greater
income inequality across the ranks. Incentive pay should thus be less acceptable in countries with
a small power distance. We accordingly expect that incentive pay for managers will be more frequent
in countries with high scores on power distance.
The individualism-collectivism variable relates to the extent to which people prefer to take care of
themselves and their immediate families rather than being bound to some wider collectivity such as
the extended family or clan. Typical individualists will tend to prefer work settings in which they
can make their own decisions, autonomy, variety and pleasure are sought in the system. Executive
incentive pay implies that compensation tends to be awarded on a more individual basis. In
collectivist countries this type of incentive pays would accordingly conflict with salient social norms.
We expect that incentive pay such as stock options and bonuses for managers will be more frequent
in individualist countries.
Institutional Constraints and Pressures
Although cross-national management research has been heavily influenced by Hofstede, cross-
national differences are probably more fully understood by considering both national culture and
social institutions. However, the controversy regarding the relative importance of culture and
institutions persists (Buck and Shahrim, 2005). Differences in compensation systems across
countries can be analyzed with regard to other differences such as national institutions (Gooderham
et al., 2004). At the same time there are organizational characteristics, such as labour relations, that
may affect the choice of incentive systems along with country-level variables (van Oudenhoven,
2001). In Scandinavia as well as in most other Western European countries, base salaries are
determined through bargaining between labour unions and the employer (or employers’ association).
Wage bargaining is done on behalf of unionized employees, but the results are frequently
implemented for many other employees (Stokke, 1998). Moreover, there may be local (company-
level) or individual bargaining in addition to or within the frames of a national or industry-wide
wage settlement.
Countries with a centralized wage bargaining system tend to have smaller wage differences than
countries with only local bargaining. Companies not covered by a national settlement will also tend
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to have the major national settlements as anchors or reference points when negotiating with their
employees. This may be done in order to make settlements legitimate internally as well as externally
(Scott and Meyer, 1994). We accordingly assume that there can be a spillover into decisions regarding
executive incentive pay – even if exectuive incentives are not covered by the wage settlement.
Because the benefits of union membership vary across countries, there is considerable variation in
the correlation between unionization and wage settlement coverage (Stokke, 1998). Unionization
may accordingly operate independently of wage bargaining. Strong unions tend to moderate
managerial power and autonomy (Gooderham et al., 1999), and therefore also tend to reduce
compensation differences within the company. Unions also tend to favour collective wages and
oppose individualized wage bargaining (as this would undermine unions). Unionization should
therefore be negatively associated with executive compensation level in general and incentive pay
in particular.
MNCs and Diffusion of Corporate Governance
Multinational corporations (MNCs) can be effective vehicles for the diffusion of HRM practices
for several reasons (Fenton-O’Creevy, Gooderham, and Nordhaug, 2005). They are generally large
and prone to adopt elaborate HRM practices, and their size and visibility in the host countries
context often make them likely role models for local companies (Mayrhofer & Brewster, 2005).
MNCs’ border spanning nature also increases their salience in the local context. US companies are
frequently regarded as such role models, and others that want to «catch up» will accordingly be
inclined to adopt US-style corporate governance (Brewster, 2004). Although evidence indicates that
practices originating in the USA are in fact widely disseminated, less research has investigated to
what degree such practices are compatible with local norms and institutions or if practices are
culturally specific and non-transferable to other contexts (Newman and Nollen, 1996; Liberman
and Torbiörn, 2000).
A basic challenge for MNCs is integrating HRM across dispersed units while at the same time
adapting to the institutional and cultural requirements of host communities (Bloom et al., 2003;
Giardini et al., 2005). Hence there are two basic mechanisms at work: a country-of-origin effect (the
MNC imposes policies on subsidiaries; or subsidiaries adopt country of origin practices in order to
look good in the eyes of the mother company) and a host-country effect (subsidiary is imprinted
with host-country context or the MNC tries to adapt to local practices) (Giardini et al., 2005;
Liberman and Torbiörn, 2000). We expect the country-of-origin effect to be notable with regard to
US MNCs such that subsidiaries of US MNCs more often than others tend to have incentive pay
for their managers.
Exposure to International Competition
Although benefits of improved corporate governance may be considerable, the motivation to pursue
those benefits may be less so. Prior success may make actors so self-complacent that they will not
feel the need to implement any changes (Miller and Chen, 1994; Greve, 2003). Firms operating with
a comfortable profit may not be motivated to exert the extra effort required to implement novel
practices to marginally increase their returns (Mayrhofer and Brewster, 2005). Such «lazy» firms can
typically be found in protected environments insulated from international competition. State-owned
companies in addition tend to be protected by politicians. Competing internationally accentuates
the need for a more intense husbandry of resources which in turn ought to accentuate the need to
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install stronger incentives for management. It may therefore be surmised that firms that are exposed
to international competition are more inclined to use elaborate compensation methods than firms
which operate exclusively within domestic markets. Another reason is that operating on the
international venue widens the scope of managerial tasks and increases the demands on managerial
efforts. In other words we expect that companies with exports are characterized by a stronger
performance focus than non-exporters.
Methods and Data
The analysis is based on data collected in a multinational survey organized by the Cranfield-network
for human resource management. The questionnaire was translated to the language of each
participating country and distributed to companies with 100 employees or more. Informants
answered questions regarding four types of incentive pay for managers: stocks/stock options, merit
pay, bonus, and profit sharing. Responses were coded as yes or no for each type of incentive pay.
Table 1 shows the number of firms by country along with the percentage of firms using incentive
pay for managers. We measured variables indicating centralization of wage bargaining in a similar
way. Informants indicated if bargaining takes place at national level (industry-wide), at company
level, or individually for each employee. Because national wage settlements may leave scope for
further bargaining at the company as well as the individual level, responses are not mutually
exclusive. Respondents were also asked to estimate the percentage of trade union member among
company employees.
Informants were further asked to describe the main geographical market for the company’s products
or services. Ordered response alternatives were: local, regional, national, European, and global. By
coding these responses from 1 to 5 this variable measures increasing exposure to international
competition. In order to capture the hypothesized influence of US multinationals we coded one
dummy for US corporate headquarters location. We further included one dummy to indicate
whether the company is owned by the state or not. In order to capture the hypothesized impact of
national culture, we assigned values for Hofstede’s (1980) individualism/collectivism and power
distance dimensions to each company according to the country in which it is situated (values included
in Table 1).
Analysis and Results
Table 1 shows the percentage of firms using incentive pay in the form of shares/options, bonuses
or any type (including merit pay and profit sharing). These are the dependent variables in the logistic
regression analyses reported in Table 2. As expected the companies in the Scandinavian countries
demonstrate low scores, whereas French firms exhibit the highest rate of incentive pay. The table
also includes scores for Hofstede’s individualism and power distance dimensions. Analysis at the
country level reveals Pearson correlations at about 0.5 between power distance and «any incentive»
as well as bonus. The per cent stocks/stock options correlates at 0.5 and 0.3 with individualism and
power distance. These correlations indicate there is in fact an association between culture and the
use of incentive pay for managers, and constitutes a preliminary support for the hypothesis that
culture does influence the adoption of incentive schemes.
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Table 1. Sample, per cent firms with incentive pay for managers and Hofstede cultural dimensions by
country.
Country Sample Incentive pay, % of firms Hofstede scores
Stocks/
options
Bonus Any incentive Individualism Powerdistance
Austria 230 7 2 70 55 11
Belgium 282 24 24 73 75 65
Denmark 515 11 11 42 74 18
France 400 34 31 94 71 68
Germany 503 18 1 82 67 35
Greece 136 18 38 83 35 60
Ireland 446 22 24 43 70 28
Israel 194 18 20 56 54 13
Italy 79 13 11 81 76 50
the Netherlands 234 15 9 59 80 40
Norway 391 12 15 42 69 31
Portugal 169 4 14 56 27 63
Spain 294 18 18 75 51 57
Switzerland 168 17 15 87 68 34
UK 1091 30 31 71 89 35
Total 5132 20 19 66 70 38
Table 2 shows the result of logistic regression analyses with regard to two types (stocks/options
and bonuses) as well as total incentive pay for managers. «Any incentive» is coded 0 (zero) if the
firm does not report any form of incentive pay for its managers, and 1 (one) if any of four types of
pay is reported. Models are identical except for the dependent variable. Models are more successful
predicting stocks/options and total incentive pay for managers (pseudo R2 around 20%) than
predicting bonuses (pseudo R2 around 10%). We included company size (logarithm of number of
employees) as a control variable, and note that the larger companies tend to offer managers incentive
pay more often.
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Table 2. Incentive pay for managers. Logistic regression.
 Stocks/ options Bonus Any incentive
Power distance 0.013 *** 0.014 *** 0.022 ***
Individualism 0.027 *** 0.018 *** 0.004  
US
multinationald
1.386 *** 0.523 *** 0.853 ***
Wage bargaining:
   Individuald 0.003  –0.011  0.174 ***
   Companyd –0.029  0.088 *** 0.111 ***
   Nationald –0.122 *** –0.116 *** –0.143 ***
Unionization –0.083 *** –0.071 *** –0.088 ***
Global market 0.263 *** 0.165 *** 0.313 ***




0.299 *** 0.059 * 0.317 ***
Model chi-sq 745.80 *** 319.34 *** 943.84 ***
–2 log
likelihood
3778.14  4062.19  4384.61  
McFadden
pseudo R2
0.16  0.07  0.18  
Nagelkerke
pseudo R2
0.24  0.11  0.28  
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
dDummy variables (if true = 1, if not = 0)
N=4321
According to these analyses high individualism and high power distance increase the probability of
implementing incentive pay. The results also indicate that US multinationals tend to export incentive
schemes for managers to their subsidiaries in Europe; this influence appears to be particularly strong
with regard to stocks or stock options (as expected). We further note that internationalization
appears to trigger the use of incentives: The more global the company’s market, the greater the
probability that some type of incentive pay for managers is applied. State owned companies clearly
have a lower probability of implementing such compensation elements.
As hypothesized, the institutional context clearly has an impact on the use of incentive pay (in
particular the combined dependent variable). The more centralized the wage bargaining, the less
probable that the company will use incentive pay for managers. Moreover, the greater the presence
of trade unions in the company, the less likely it is that the managers of the company will receive
such pay in addition to the base salary.
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Although there are some differences in coefficient estimates, the results are generally robust across
types of incentive pay. The impact of individualism is the only notable exception from this pattern.
In addition, individual bargaining appears to influence the use of other types of incentive pay
(covered by the combined variable), but not stock options or bonuses. This corroborates the results
above and lends support to our assumption that different types of incentive pay are functional
substitutes.
Discussion and Conclusion
The results essentially support our basic proposition. Companies situated in countries that have
high scores on power distance tend to use incentive compensation schemes for managers more
frequently than do companies in other countries. European subsidiaries of US corporations tend
to use such schemes more than subsidiaries of Asian or European corporations. Centralized wage
bargaining and unionization (both measured at the firm level) tend to reduce the prevalence of such
schemes for managers. The results also show that the more global the environment in which the
firm operates, the greater the probability that it will install incentive pay for managers. Larger firms
also tend to implement incentives more often than smaller firms. The analysis does not support our
expectation that incentive pay would be more common in countries with high scores on Hofstede’s
individualism dimension. The results are robust across types of incentive pay.
Although Hofstede’s theory has for decades been the benchmark in cross-cultural research and
management, substantial criticisms have also accumulated. Some critics have pointed out that
Hofstede’s data, collected around 1967–73, are now getting old and that the world have changed
both politically and economically (McSweeney, 2002; van Oudenhoven, 2001; Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner, 1998). Cultures change and globalization may lead to a convergence of culture
in general and in organizational culture particular (Gooderham and Nordhaug, 2002; van
Oudenhoven, 2001). It has for example been proposed that because of globalisation younger people
in particular are converging around a common set of values. Critics have further contended that the
research by Hofstede and his associates was culturally biased because Hofstede’s team comprised
Europeans and Americans whereas the studies include many countries from other parts of the world
(Roberts and Boyacigiller, 1984). However, in the context of this article, where the aim is to apply
Hofstede’s findings on a European basis, this is a less relevant problem. A final criticism involves
seeming anomalies in Hofstede’s research. For example Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s
(1998) research suggests that German corporate culture is substantially more hierarchical than
Hofstede’s finding implies.
In this paper we have contrasted the impact of cultural and institutional factors. In a broader
perspective it would also be relevant to consider whether and, eventually, to what extent these are
causally related. Are, for example, egalitarian norms in Scandinavia a result of decades of government
and trade union efforts to reduce inequalities or are they merely a manifestation of norms that already
existed? In the first case, egalitarian norms are a great success for the trade unions and the social
democrat parties, whereas in the latter case trade unions and social democrat succeeded because of
these norms.
If cultures are indeed more malleable than frequently assumed, labour market institutions and their
associated politics (rather than prevailing norms) will form the major obstacles to Americanization
of European compensation practices. The United Kingdom experiences during the Thatcher period
suggest that norms adjust to practices rather than the other way around: In the 1970s compensation
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practices in Britain did not differ much from those in Scandinavia. Wage differentials were small,
and UK top managers were paid less than their colleagues in other large industrialized countries.
During the 1980s executive pay changed dramatically along with labour market reforms
implemented by the Thatcher government, and UK executives were now among the best paid
(Cheffins, 2003). We might speculate if the Americanization of UK corporations occurred as result
of politics rather than as a result of a common Anglo-American culture.
Our findings indicate that cultures with high power distance are more receptive to incentive pay for
managers and that such compensation practices tend to be imported from the USA. The results
further suggest that for companies involved in international competition there is more pressure or
perhaps stronger needs to implement incentive pay for managers. At the same time unions and
national labour market institutions seem to act as buffers against the introduction of US-style
compensation schemes. Moreover, the analysis suggests that institutional conditions play a
somewhat more active role in determining the use of incentive pay than do the companies’ national,
cultural embeddedness. Although internationalization of corporations and product markets are
strong forces behind changes in managerial styles, the research reported in this study also suggests
that politics and national institutions are major obstacles to Americanization or cross-European
standardization of corporate governance, at least in regard to incentive systems.
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